INTRODUCTION AND SCOPE

Double
system is drawn through two stages of high-efficiency particulate air (HEPA) filtration to ensure confinement of airborne radioactive materials. Active ventilation exhaust stacks require a stack CAM interlock to detect releases from postulated accidents, and to shut down the exhaust fan when high radiation levels are detected in the stack airstream. The stack CAM interlock is credited as a mitigating control to stop continued unfiltered radiological and toxicological discharges from the stack, which may result from an accident involving failure of a HEPA filter.
Recently, it has been determined that an alternative system, based on monitoring HEPA filter differential pressure (DP, or AP), is technically equivalent to the stack CAM interlock and can perform its safety function (Gustavson 2000; ORP 2000). level of control specified in the facility safety analysis, and is expected to provide this function more reliably and with fewer operational and maintenance problems. operating cost, and more reliable waste transfers or waste feed delivery. The tank farms operating contractor has been directed by DOE to implement the alternative system on active ventilation systems in the process area applicability statement o f LCO 3. The HEPA Filter AD Interlock System shall activate an interlock to shut down the ventilation system automatically when AD across the last HEPA filter stage reaches a preset low limit, indicating a gross filter f ai lure. To perform its safety functions, the AP interlock system must be continuously operable and it must fail in a safe condition (exhauster shut down) upon a loss of power or a detectable failure.
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FUNCTIONS AND REQUIREMENTS
System D e f i n i t i o n
A d i f f e r e n t i a l pressure (AP) i n t e r l o c k system s h a l l be provided t h a t measures HEPA f i l t e r a i r f l o w resistance, o r pressure drop, and performs t h e s a f e t y r e l a t e d i n t e r l o c k f u n c t i o n s described i n Section 2.0 o f t h i s document.
The AP i n t e r l o c k system s h a l l be o f a generic design, capable o f being i n s t a l l e d and operated on f a c i l i t y v e n t i l a t i o n systems a t m u l t i p l e l o c a t i o n s ( l i s t e d i n Section 7.1, below) w i t h minor s i t e -s p e c i f i c engineering.
The system s h a l l measure AP across t h e " f i r s t " (i.e., upstream) HEPA f i l t e r stage, t h e "second" (i.e.? downstream) HEPA f i l t e r stage, and t h e combined AP across t h e f i l t e r t r a i n (i.e., both HEPA f i l t e r stages i n s e r i e s ) .
s h a l l p r o v i d e c a p a b i l i t y t o alarm and a c t i v a t e an i n t e r l o c k t o shut down t h e v e n t i l a t i o n f a n a t predetermined AP s e t p o i n t s across e i t h e r o r both f i l t e r stages. The system s h a l l a l s o measure AP across t h e p r e f i l t e r , p r o v i d i n g l o c a l i n d i c a t i o n f o r maintenance and s u r v e i l l a n c e purposes, i n those cases where e x i s t i n g systems have t h i s l o c a l i n d i c a t i o n .
The actual AP l i m i t s and operating modes f o r t h e proposed system s h a l l be based on an approved AB change (TSR c o n t r o l s ) . 
provide t h e f l e x i b i l i t y t o support a reasonable range o f operational s e t t i n g s , alarms, and i n t e r l o c k s t o be d i c t a t e d by such analysis. d i f f e r e n t i a l pressure i s generated and what l i m i t a t i o n s e x i s t , i n r e l a t i o n t o proposed TSR l i m i t s , i s included i n a recent engineering e v a l u a t i o n (Gustavson 2000). The system s h a l l have t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o a c t on both low and h i g h AP i n t e r l o c k s e t p o i n t s . s t a t e (i.e., t i e -i n t o a l o c a l c o n t r o l room alarm panel), t o enable operators t o a s c e r t a i n t h e cause o f t h e system shutdown p r i o r t o e n t e r i n g t h e f a c i l i t y .
Based on f u t u r e s a f e t y analysis and p o t e n t i a l requirements t h a t may be imposed on t h e system design, t h e r e may be a need f o r t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o t r a c k r a t e o f change i n f i l t e r AP, and t o i n i t i a t e t h e i n t e r l o c k t o shut down t h e f a n a t a p r e s e t "rate-of-change" c o n d i t i o n . s u f f i c i e n t memory, would be needed t o provide t h i s c a p a b i l i t y i n a d d i t i o n t o t h e r e q u i r e d low and h i g h AP i n t e r l o c k s . f e a t u r e i s n o t a c u r r e n t design requirement f o r t h e system. However, e i t h e r t h e c u r r e n t design s h a l l provide t h e a d d i t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y t o be configured as a fan i n t e r l o c k based on t h e "rate-of-change'' o f f i l t e r AP, o r i t s h a l l n o t preclude adding t h i s f e a t u r e i n t h e f u t u r e .
A d d i t i o n a l l y , a d e s i r e d f e a t u r e o f t h e AP i n t e r l o c k system i s t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o t r a c k t h e r a t e o f change i n t h e various f i l t e r AP
C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s
The AP i n t e r l o c k system design s h a l l u t i l i z e AP t r a n s m i t t e r s t o monitor pressure drop across t h e HEPA f i l t e r s , and a programmable l o g i c c o n t r o l l e r The system shall provide means of signal conditioning, or the ability to adjust or dampen the signal to prevent spurious alarms and shutdowns.
The AF' setpoints shall be adjustable to accommodate changes in established operating specifications, based on further accident analysis or operating experience.
In addition, the AP RPP-PRO-309.
General Technical Design Criteria
The design shall comply with the requirements defined in this document. The criteria of DOE 6430.1A, Genera7 Design Criteria, shall be applied to the design as deemed appropriate by the Design Authority; the applicability of DOE 6430.1A criteria to RPP facilities is the subject of ongoing evaluation.
The AP interlock system shall be designed for year-round operation in an outdoor environment at the Hanford site. Environmental conditions to consider in the design and selection of components shall include exposure to sunlight, rain, frozen precipitation, wind, blowing sand and dust, and ambient air temperatures ranging from -25°F (-32'C) to 115°F (46°C). Components not rated for the specified conditions shall be housed in a cabinet that provides a sui table operating environment.
All "wetted" components shall be compatible with a ventilation air stream characterized by high relative humidity (up to 100%) and temperatures ranging from 40°F to 150°F. In addition, the "wetted" components shall be compatible with varying amounts of hydrogen, nitrous oxide, methane, and ammonia vapors as minor constituents of the air stream.
The system shall be designed and installed to facilitate routine maintenance, including ease of removal and calibration of components. Sufficient isolation valves shall be provided to isolate instruments from the ventilation airstream and to enable calibration and maintenance.
The system design shall include provisions for periodic calibration and functional testing of interlock functions, and shall provide means to calibrate and test components in place without shutting the ventilation system down. Self-diagnosing and self-testing features shall also be considered to facilitate maintenance.
Component and tubing supports shall be provided to resist, as a minimum, the seismic and other natural phenomena loads defined in RPP-PRO-97 for general service or "PCl" SSCs, except that structures supporting safety related components shall be evaluated against "PC3" wind loads. The applicability of the "PC3" wind-generated missile criterion is the subject of an ongoing evaluation and will be applied as directed by the CH2M-Hill Hanford Group, Inc. (CHG) Chief Engineer.
Civil Engineering and Site Work
The AP interlock system shall be designed to minimize the extent o f excavation or other site work required for its installation. Prior to release of the initial system design, the system "footprint" and interfaces shall be reviewed for necessary clearances and constructability, at least for the proposed seven initial installations (see Section 7.1).
Mechanical Engineering and Materials
Materials shall be traceable to ASTM standards, vendor information, or other documentation for any properties (e.g., chemical compatibilities, yield strength) that are relied upon in the design, or that could significantly affect system performance. 
Tubing
Safety
The AP interlock system shall be designed with the intent to minimize environmental releases and worker exposure to As Low As Reasonably Achievable (ALARA) during installation, operation, and maintenance of the system.
Human Engineering
The system shall be designed with consideration of human factors, encompassing such ergonomic factors as accessibility of valves and equipment for maintenance and operation, display readability, and method of recording data. The design shall also consider features that enable remote monitoring and diagnostics, or minimize surveillance and maintenance time required in field.
Qualification
A process shall be used to ensure that the system can perform its safety function reliably, under the stated operating conditions. Methods of qualification may include inspection or testing.
QUALITY ASSURANCE
Where applicable, equipment shall be procured as Safety Class and Quality Level "1" (QL-1), with appropriate documentation. Instrumentation shall be appropriately certified by the manufacturer. The system shall be acceptance tested prior to installation in the field.
A quality assurance (QA) process shall be followed in the design, procurement, and installation of the system. An ABU checklist
